On January 25, 1995, Russia’s early-warning defense radar detected an unexpected missile launch near Norway, and Russian military command estimated the missile to be only minutes from impact on Moscow.
Moments later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, his defense minister, and his chief of staff were informed of the missile launch. The nuclear command systems switched to combat mode, and the nuclear suitcases carried by Yeltsin and his top commander were activated for the first time in the history of the Soviet-made weapons system. Five minutes after the launch detection, Russian command determined that the missile’s impact point would be outside Russia’s borders. Three more minutes passed, and Yeltsin was informed that the launching was likely not part of a surprise nuclear strike by Western nuclear submarines.
These conclusions came minutes before Yeltsin and his commanders should have ordered a nuclear response based on standard launch on warning protocols.
Later, it was revealed that the missile, launched from Spitzbergen, Norway, was actually carrying instruments for scientific measurements. Nine days before, Norway had notified 35 countries, including Russia, of the exact details of the planned launch. The Russian Defense Ministry had received Norway’s announcement but had neglected to inform the on-duty personnel at the early-warning center of the imminent launch. The event raised serious concerns about the quality of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear systems.

I recently mentioned our own lost nukes. Some are still somewhere, not yet found.
When I was in Alaska a worst kept secret was Soviet jets intruding our airspace to see how long it took us to scramble and leaving before our fighters arrived. (There were rumors that our airforce pulled the same stunt.) A miscalculated location could have caused an incident.
Both the US and Russia lost subs at sea through mishap–with a nuclear reactor.
“Dr. Strangelove” is a movie I could watch again—the scariest parody I’ve ever seen.